State, Constitution, and Parliament: Three Axes of the Spanish Constitutional Debate of 1931 by Bellido, Francisco J.
A N N A L E S
U N I V E R S I TAT I S  M A R I A E  C U R I E - S K Ł O D O W S K A
LUBLIN – POLONIA
VOL. XXVII, 2 SECTIO K  2020
DOI:10.17951/k.2020.27.2.47- 57
Universities of Málaga (Spain) and Jyväskylä (Finland)
FRANCISCO J. BELLIDO
ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5250-0053
State, Constitution, and Parliament: Three Axes of the Spanish 
Constitutional Debate of 19311
ABSTRACT
This article aims to elucidate the relationship between the ideas of state, constitution, and Parliament 
in the Spanish constitutional debate of 1931. It argues that Members of Parliament (MPs) made a valuable 
contribution when understanding the relevance of this interrelation in terms of political philosophy and 
legal theory. From a methodological perspective, this study pays attention to the arguments of MPs in 
the course of the constitutional sessions which took place between August and December 1931. In doing 
so, it portrays the ideological differences of left-wing, centrist and right-wing parties in that constituent 
assembly. In the first section (“European influences on the Constitution of 1931”) the intellectual links 
with interwar trends of public law, administrative law and European constitutionalism are highlighted. The 
second section (“Constitution and Parliament according to Spanish representatives”), shows the meanings 
given to this nascent constitutional democracy by MPs. Despite their ideological differences they were 
in favour of strengthening Parliament and the Constitution as a prerequisite for safeguarding democracy. 
The conclusions resume the argumentative thread, that is to say, that the regime, a democratic republic, 
was understood by a large majority of MPs as the confluence of three conditions founded on doctrinal and 
conceptual exchanges from interwar European constitutionalism: the acknowledgement of parliamentary 
sovereignty, the legal and administrative revamping of institutions, and state intervention in the economy.
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INTRODUCTION
Speeches on the role of Parliament and the Constitution were presented during 
the months of August and December 1931 in the constituent assembly (Cortes Consti-
tuyentes) of the Spanish Second Republic. Both right-wing and left-wing representa-
tives usually argued in favour of Parliament as the primary institution of the nascent 
democracy. Without it, the new regime could not qualify as a republican democracy. 
Most MPs thought that the constitutional draft should be adapted to the reality in the 
country: economic backwardness, concentration of agrarian property in the hands 
of big landowners, illiteracy of many citizens and inefficient administration, among 
others. That claim stressed that the competences of the courts of justice and Parlia-
ment should be clearly separated from each other in order to safeguard democracy.
For centre-left MPs, the Republican Action Party and some members of the Span-
ish Socialist Workers’ Party, the new constitutional state meant that only Parliament 
(Cortes) had the legitimacy to transform Spain through economic and social laws 
complying with the rights acknowledged in the new Constitution of 1931 (regarded as 
the supreme law of the country). According to centre and centre-right MPs (Radical 
Republican Party, Progressive Republican Party, Group at the Service of the Repub-
lic, Liberal Democratic Republican Party and some agrarian representatives), the 
Constitution should serve as a reformist deal between left and right to reach reforms 
by keeping political and economic stability.
The first governments of the Republic worked for about two years with institu-
tions of a still weak parliamentary regime. They were unable to form stable majorities 
in the long run due to the fragmented structure in the number of seats that resulted 
from the general election of June 1931 [Sánchez Agesta 1984: 472]. MPs sought 
to coordinate the representative function of Parliament, elected by universal male 
suffrage, with a procedure of direct democracy established in Article 66 of the Con-
stitution: “The people will be able to decide through referendum the laws voted by 
Parliament. To do so it will be enough that 15 percent of the electoral body request 
it”. That way MPs aimed to assure instruments of direct democracy. As a setback, 
instead, governmental instability and confusing constitutional interpretations about 
the formation of government and the vote of confidence made it difficult to combine 
mechanisms of direct and representative democracy in practice.
The new boost given to the Constitution relied on three factors which not all MPs 
did always share: a closer adjustment of institutions to the precarious socioeconomic 
conditions of the country, the uniformity of the legal system across the country, and 
the supreme law of the nation embodied by the constitutional text as the appropriate 
instrument to guarantee rights [Roura Gómez 1998: 272]. The second and third fac-
tors were political novelties when compared to the Spanish parliamentary tradition 
going back to the 19th century.
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EUROPEAN INFLUENCES ON ThE CONSTITUTION OF 1931
Central European and French public law doctrines that were coined between the 
end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries made explicit that constitutions 
exist to guide the ordinary laws of a country through a set of consistent principles 
[Muñoz Machado 2004: 45]. Nonetheless, the discredit of written constitutions was 
still a hindrance that only by the end of the 1910s, and beginning of the 1920s was 
challenged by recent doctrines of Central European public lawyers. They advocated 
written constitutions as the highest laws of the legal order of a country. Actually, all 
political parties in the Spanish Parliament agreed on the foundational character of 
the Constitution, with the exception of the conservative Basque-Navarre Minority. 
According to MP Antonio Royo Villanova, of the Popular Agrarian Minority, the 
aim of a constitution is to shape the political structure of the state. That end has to be 
contrasted with Carl Schmitt’s idea in his Verfassungslehre (Constitutional Theory), 
disputed during European scholarly debates that the proper subject of any constitution 
is the political unity of the people, not that of the state.
Nonetheless, the influence of Schmitt among Spanish MPs is hard to estimate, 
whereas hans Kelsen’s ideas can be easily checked. his name, sometimes wrongly 
transcribed as “Kelssen”, is quoted at different times of the constitutional debate 
between August and November, almost always in connection with his key role in 
the writing process of the Austrian Constitution of 1920 and the creation of a con-
stitutional court. In the book originally published in German as Hauptprobleme der 
Staatsrechtslehre, (Main Problems of the Public Law Doctrine), in Spanish Prob-
lemas capitales de la teoría jurídica del Estado, Kelsen objected to consider the 
legislative process as a state act that depends on institutions formed by the people. 
he understood from its origin law-making as a state act that takes place before its 
institutions are completely shaped. Only in a final step can the state organs be com-
pleted. The Weimar Constitution of 1919 pointed out this new trend. Nicolás Pérez 
Serrano, a prominent Spanish jurist who participated in the drafting process of the 
Spanish Constitution, regretted that the influence of the Constitution of Weimar on 
the Spanish Constitution of 1931 was exerted just at the same time the Republic of 
Weimar became an unstable regime [Pérez Serrano 1984: 574].
Among the writings that were read by some Spanish MPs trained in Germany, 
Die Souveränität. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des Staats- und Völkerrechts (Sovereignty: 
A Contribution to the Theory of Public and International Law) by hermann heller, 
was an influential text to understand the diverse controversies around the meanings of 
state sovereignty in interwar constitutionalism. There, sovereignty appears as a pure 
legal concept that highlights the relationship between an organ or decision-making 
authority and positive law, regardless of other rules and social forces. One year 
later, the book originally published in German as Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht 
and translated into Spanish as Constitución y derecho constitucional (Constitution 
and Constitutional Law) was published by the antipositivist Rudolf Smend. In his 
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view, the tasks of the state represent aspects belonging to a certain culture, and such 
a culture cannot be separated from the own aims whether of the state or the law. hel-
ler’s account was opposed both to Kelsen’s positivism and to the full antipositivism 
embodied by Smend. The clash between these two perspectives also took place in 
the Spanish Constituent Assembly, even if explicit mentions to those scholars were 
relatively scarce.
Among MPs, Manuel Azaña, of the Republican Action Party, prime minister 
(Presidente del Consejo de Ministros de España) from October to December 1931 
spoke about the Spanish “political problem”: “to organise the state so as to make it 
adequate to this new and historic phase of the Spanish people” [DSCCRE, 13 October 
1931: 1667]. Royo Villanova, of the Popular Agrarian Minority, clearly distinguished 
between the powers of the state and its proper activity to say that “the state is not 
a power” [Royo Villanova, 1923: 223]. His opinion was favourable to the principle 
of legality as understood by Léon Duguit: no authority can act by itself in accordance 
to law dismissing other state institutions [Royo Villanova, 1923: 666–667]. Arbi-
trariness by the state was one of his main political and legal concerns. That issue is 
reflected both in his speeches in Parliament and in his book Elementos de Derecho 
Administrativo (Handbook of Administrative Law).2
Likewise, Royo Villanova resumes the arguments by Joseph Barthélemy about the 
public budget of beneficence for the Catholic Church by arguing that public money can 
sometimes benefit the interests of some tax payers and at the same time be neutral or 
even harmful to the interests of others. he attributed solidarity to the state and public 
powers as their distinctive feature [Royo Villanova 1923: 515]. Following French 
doctrines and the writings by the Spanish professor of administrative and state law José 
Gascón y Marín, Royo Villanova accepted state intervention in the local realm as pre-
cisely the distinctive and dominant feature of contemporary administrative law, which 
made it different from former and outdated trends. hence, he fully distinguishes state 
interventionism from socialism in the Marxist sense [Royo Villanova 1923: 271–275].
French legal doctrines were also influential among Spanish MPs. The ideas of 
Raymond Carré de Malberg gave grounds to a personality of the state as a conse-
quence of the legal order, as he wrote in Contribution à la théorie générale de l’État 
(Contribution to a General Theory of the State). This was commonplace, repeated 
and assumed by a number of representatives in Parliament. The theories of Maurice 
hauriou and Adhémar Esmein, to mention the most remarkable examples, were a de-
cisive factor in understanding public initiative as a counterweight to the individual 
one. hauriou himself considered that function one of the essential features of the 
state in Précis de droit constitutionnel (Summary of Constitutional Law).
2 According to Royo Villanova, a liberal state is characterised by principles such as: to declare the 
primacy of the rights of people in line with Rousseau’s political philosophy, to attain a division of powers 
imitating Montesquieu’s original ideas, a rule of law inspired by the German Rechtsstaat and a parliamentary 
regime to include the main features of Westminster [Calonge 2017: 62].
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Nonetheless, the Constitution of 1931 did not only receive external influences, 
but it was itself a source of inspiration to understand the process of regional decen-
tralisation in the manner of the so-called “integral state”. In 1932, professor of state 
theory Eduardo Luis Lloréns published La autonomía en la integración política 
(The Autonomy of Political Integration) to defend the distribution of competences 
between state and regions to set limits on regional autonomy through a series of rules 
[Lloréns 1932: 120]. Luis Jiménez de Asúa, of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, 
mentioned in his inaugural speech during the constitutional debate Otto von Gierke 
and Georg Jellinekas – the legal scholars who prevented Hugo Preuss from devel-
oping the project of an integral state in the Weimar Constitution of 1919 [DSCCRE, 
27 August 1931: 645]. These facts reveal a remarkable degree of acquaintance of 
Spanish legal scholars and politicians with French and German trends of public law.
Analysing the legal references about the ideas of state and constitution during the 
constituent assembly the following speeches should be emphasised: Emiliano Iglesias 
Ambrosio, of the Radical Republican Party, quoted Preuss as inspiring the preamble 
and the preliminary title of the Constitution [DSCCRE, 15 September 1931: 919]; 
Luis Araquistáin, of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, understood the new ideas 
held by Kelsen and Duguit as representative of a new trend that considered society and 
individuals, neither the nation nor the state, the main focus of the law [DSCCRE, 16 
September 1931: 942–943]; Justo Villanueva, of the Radical Republican Party, resumed 
Jellinek’s ideas in his speech of 18 September 1931 to argue that the right to preserve 
the territory was an inescapable function of the state [DSCCRE, 18 September 1931: 
1030]; Jiménez de Asúa claimed that the thesis of the integral state was intermediate 
between “the federal sense and the unitary sense” the same day that the Constitution 
was passed in Parliament [DSCCRE, 9 December 1931: 2907]. The development of the 
idea of state in the new doctrines of public law during the first third of the 20th century 
can be easily checked by enquiring into the speeches of Spanish MPs.
From the point of view of their legal regulation, the approval of social laws de-
pended on parliamentary majorities. Constitutional constraints, instead, were to be 
settled by the constitutional court (Tribunal de Garantías Constitucionales). Contra-
dictions between constitutional provisions and ordinary social legislation should be 
resolved by legislators [Ayala 1932: 11]. That fact entailed a new understanding of 
the role of representatives in the legal system which conferred them broader powers 
to decide on the legality of passed laws.
CONSTITUTION AND PARLIAMENT ACCORDING  
TO SPANISh REPRESENTATIVES
As a token of the strong link between the role assigned to Parliament and the 
principle of the separation of powers, in the foundational manifesto of the Progressive 
Republican Party (Liberal Republican Right until 1931), published in July 1930, one 
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of its first concerns had to do with parliamentarism. Parliaments were portrayed as 
potential instruments to improve the balance of powers in a republican democracy, 
though they equated pure parliamentarism without presidential powers with a dis-
solute, dysfunctional regime. The temptation of MPs not to legislate could lead to 
instability and lack of coordination between powers [Artola [1974] 1991: 327].
During the 19th century, the so-called internal, or historical, constitution was 
drawn as the compendium of old treatises and “historical rights” acquired by different 
social strata and territorial bodies: from clerical rights to local ones [Portillo Valdés 
2002: 189]. Then, the idea of a historical constitution was not new in Spain, even 
though towards the second decade of the 20th century, its previous wider acceptance 
began to disappear. The majority of left-wing and centre parties involved in the 
constitution-making of 1931 rejected the idea of a historical constitution as useless 
as far as building a political regime is concerned.
Still in 1931, referring to an ancient, unwritten constitution meant to defend 
a certain historical sense of stability which was considered necessary to approve 
a new constitution. Radical centrism and democratic socialism opposed their idea of 
the Constitution of 1931 as the supreme law of the legal order to the moderate and 
conservative liberalism of 19th-century Spain [Varela Suanzes-Carpegna 2007: 525]. 
however, a careful revision of the constitutional debate demonstrates that a certain 
number of right-wing MPs such as Niceto Alcalá-Zamora, and Juan Castrillo, both of 
the Progressive Republican Party, together with some agrarian and Basque-Navarre 
representatives appealed to a supposed inner (historical) constitution of the country.
In a similar vein, Julián Ayesta Manchola, of the Progressive Republican Party, 
aimed to highlight the liberal sense of the Constitution over alternative understandings 
of popular and national sovereignty. No personal power can be included within the 
laws of the republican democracy. Parliament’s sovereignty, legislative sovereignty 
and popular sovereignty expressed together the complex nature of the modern idea 
of sovereignty. Ayesta Manchola took a stance in favour of it when deliberating on 
the withdrawal of constitutional guarantees in specific cases:
There is no personal power that the Republic has to defend, but only the security 
of the state. And at the same time, it demands that the seriousness would be evident and 
imminent. Ultimately, Parliament, when transferring this prerogative, does not reduce 
its sovereignty, the sovereignty of the legislative power, but it is the legislative power 
itself that in this case, as in others, transfers its own sovereignty because it [the legisla-
tive power – F.J.B.] is precisely the sovereign and the only one to determine the rule to 
follow to benefit the Republic, that is to preserve the constitutional order. [DSCCRE, 
2 October 1931: 1416–1417]
The powers of the state were not in a perfect balance, but institutional counter-
weights helped to preserve a high degree of compatibility and autonomy between 
different authorities: Parliament, constitution, ordinary laws, people’s sovereignty, 
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government and judicial power. This idea of sovereignty reshaped the classical un-
derstanding of popular and national sovereignty in favour of institutions as holders 
and instruments of shared sovereignty.
José Álvarez Buylla, of the Radical Republican Party, stood up for a flexible 
constitution able to be adapted to different circumstances and to be reformed when 
needed. Dictatorship is identified as the main cause of political distrust of institutions. 
A flexible constitution was needed in order to assure that new rights would not be 
betrayed in the future. To satisfy popular demands was not just the result of people’s 
sovereignty but, as the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party expressed, it was a task 
of constituent members as representatives of the nation in Parliament [DSCCRE, 
1 September 1931: 695].
The intellectual concern for Spain of the MPs that belonged to the Group at the 
Service of the Republic led them to compare the constitutional draft of 1931 with 
features from past constitutions and regimes. For instance, a speech by José Ortega 
y Gasset highlighted the task that MPs faced when drafting a democratic constitution 
in metaphorical terms. According to him, the Constitution would be “a formidable 
machine” working according to certain principles which produced a number of both 
intended and unintended effects. As a consequence, he concluded: “our task is, then, 
one of engineering” [DSCCRE, 4 September 1931: 772].
To give an illustration, Ortega sharply argued that the executive power, to regu-
larly work as an effective power, should not be entirely subordinated to Parliament 
in every step of the decision-making process. Otherwise, the structure of the state 
would be dysfunctional with an unworkable executive. If the tendency were just 
the opposite, that is to say, the legislative branch under the executive power, then 
the state would be unprotected against arbitrariness. A paralysed government was 
a danger which, accordingly, demanded to build a strong Parliament balanced with 
the executive power. Conflicts between these two branches were to be reduced as 
much as possible. That was precisely one of the ends of any modern democratic 
regime in Ortega’s view [DSCCRE, 4 September 1931: 776].
In that same speech Ortega praises the balance in the Constitution between the 
powers of Parliament and those of the executive branch. Although the government 
requires a moderate and tempered Parliament, the executive branch needs its own 
domain for developing its activity and should not be subject to Parliament in all its 
actions. For that reason, the Constitution could help to solve that problem:
These times demand, then, a restrained Parliament but, in truth, with full and sharp 
efficiency of its attributes. Against it, the [constitutional – F.J.B.] draft presents an ex-
ecutive power that is comfortably independently above Parliament. That is, as I see it, 
the greatest point, the most exemplary and apt part of the draft. Instead of resolving the 
opposition between both powers, putting one before the other, it has raised each one of 
them to its peak. [DSCCRE, 4 September 1931: 777]
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Other moderate representatives of the same parliamentary group, for example, 
Vicente Iranzo, argued that the failure of the 19th-century liberal constitutional state 
was due to the wrongdoings of past political leaders in determining the country’s 
historical moments. Both Ortega and Iranzo believed that, because of that betrayal, 
liberal constitutions failed to build a liberal state [DSCCRE, 1 October 1931: 1370].
That, and not deficient constitutional efforts, was interpreted by a number of 
left MPs as the reason for hardly effective, unsatisfactory public powers. Ascribing 
political responsibilities to both the classic liberals and authoritarian men of the 
constitutional tradition rhetorically strengthened by contrast the positive meaning 
of the republican democracy. Nevertheless, the constitutional tradition of Spain 
itself was not rejected. Criticisms related mainly to the wrongdoings of rulers than 
to deficient ideas or laws.
Francisco Javier Elola, of the Radical Republican Party and member of the 
Legal Advisory Committee which prepared the preliminary draft of the Constitu-
tion, affirmed that the text does not differ from a set of rules, more or less perfect, 
which regulate political powers at certain historical moments. he wanted to say that 
constitutions offer guidelines for citizens to drive their public life accordingly and 
principles for state action in the daily life of institutions [DSCCRE, 17 November 
1931: 2381]. Thus, the Spanish democracy was regarded as relying on the joint 
foundation of Parliament and the Constitution.
Another radical republican MP, Emiliano Iglesias Ambrosio, connected the Consti-
tution with the idea of building the structure of the legal system for the nation. he em-
phasised the lack of attention that the constitutional committee had paid to it. Doctrinal 
principles were essential to any draft. Without them constitutions cannot succeed. The 
balance between the different organs of the state in the new constitutionalism added 
overwhelming complexities if compared to the liberal institutions of previous decades:
We, within the committee, have not talked about or discussed at all the doctrinal 
principles which every Constitution has to start from, that is to say, what is the matter of 
law, how law is organised, what is the organ of law, and what are the relationships between 
the organs of law and the living matter of law. [DSCCRE, 15 September 1931: 917]
Legislative procedures depended on different organs. Their contents were contest-
ed because there are no common grounds accepted by political representatives about 
how to regulate the law and what the relationships between different institutions would 
be like. Thus, doctrinal and procedural disagreements were unavoidable. In fact, dif-
ferent political parties suggested incompatible answers to these constitutional issues.
As a token of this tendency, Mariano Ruiz Funes, of the Republican Action Party, 
distinguished the three powers that according to him were central to the constitutional 
project: the power of Parliament, the presidential power that was initially assigned 
to MP Alcalá-Zamora and the power of government in the hands of a large coalition 
of parties. According to Ruiz Funes, these three different powers had to be mutu-
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ally coordinated [DSCCRE, 27 October 1931: 1956]. In doing so, state institutions 
provided political stability. Otherwise, if these powers acted independently of each 
other, the state would lose its efficiency.
This balance of institutions in line with political liberalism, as defended by 
Melquíades Álvarez, of the Liberal Democratic Republican Party, also mean to advo-
cate a constitution that can guarantee the rights of all citizens and prevent the abuses 
of majorities against minorities. Conflict in society was mediated through institutions 
and laws that would provide the necessary instruments to diminish its impact in the 
civil and political life since the “Constitution is nothing other than a law of guarantees 
that protects and gives shelter to the rights of everyone, of us all, of all the ideas”. He 
continues to affirm that to have a liberal constitution is equated with the defence of 
individuals against the state and “of the general interests against particular ones, even 
if this could seem paradoxical and unnecessary” [DSCCRE, 9 September 1931: 816].
With a similar aim, Santiago Alba, an independent representative of monarchic 
constitutionalism, regarded Parliament as the ideal place for exchanging ideas be-
tween the executive power and the different representatives of the nation, even if he 
believed that this relationship was being broken: “The essence of a parliamentary 
regime, in a constituent assembly and in other kinds of assemblies, is a dialogue 
between the executive power and Parliament. But here that dialogue is not taking 
place in this confusing moment in Parliament” [DSCCRE, 16 September 1931: 965].
With similar nuances, in October, the Catholic independent representative Ángel 
Ossorio y Gallardo defines Parliament as a high aspiration of politics based on the 
deliberation about rival ideas and different viewpoints about any issue of the state 
where minorities are essential. Agreements, even if desirable, are not always possi-
ble: “Parliament is a comparison of ideas, clash of aspirations, contest of feelings” 
[DSCCRE, 15 October 1931: 1744].
These different views were not legally neutral. For instance, Royo Villanova 
distinguished the central state administration in contemporary societies as a growing 
system indispensable to distribute resources and to safeguard the normal government 
functions, conferring exclusively to constitutional law the capacity to solve the 
problems of the political structure of the state [Royo Villanova 1923: 13]. Doctrinal 
disagreements, far from being exceptional, remained constant between government 
and opposition during the constitutional debate. To reconcile individual liberties 
with the new social ends acknowledged in interwar constitutions was particularly 
a growing concern for MPs with legal training.
CONCLUSIONS
In the constitutional debate, MPs interpreted the revamping of the state differently 
(extension of new rights in the Constitution, balance of powers and state institutions, 
pace of reform policies and scope of economic intervention) but also with shared con-
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cerns (strengthening the state through institutions and laws, enlarging citizens’ freedoms 
and easing the access to primary education for children from all social classes).
The political language of Spanish MPs was a typical European parliamentary 
language of that time, where concepts such as democracy, law, constitution and 
republic were connected to each other and to other concepts forming the basic vo-
cabulary used by political representatives in the constituent assembly. Institutional 
design was inconceivable for them without taking into account new political concerns 
related to an updated interpretation of those basic ideas. Even if a political agenda 
in the modern sense was not explicitly recognised as such, the parliamentary sys-
tem worked accordingly responding to the demands of a pluralist political system 
and, in the political language, showing the ideological complexity of a late case of 
interwar constitution-making. Past and contemporary European experiences were 
the historical background. The parliamentary debates of the Spanish Constituent 
Assembly 1931 provided a fair example of conceptual and argumentative transfers 
in European constitution-making.
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